[en] [fr]
Market power mitigation by contracts
B. Willems (Tilburg University) - Mars 200804 mars 2008, de 10h30 à 12h30
GIS LARSEN, campus de Fontenay aux Roses
Intervenant : Bert Willems (Tilburg Law and Economic Center, Tilburg University)
Abstract : The presentation aims to discuss the classical results of Allaz et Villa (1993) on the mitigation of market power incentives by the development of forward contracts. We model a repeated game where firms decide about contracts and production in each stage and where their risk exposure is regulated. It shows that the reduction of system risk and the reduction of market power might go hand in hand.
Laboratoire
d'Analyse Economique
des Réseaux
et des Systèmes
Energétiques
d'Analyse Economique
des Réseaux
et des Systèmes
Energétiques
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